A Constitutional Political Economy Perspective on International Trade by Vanberg, Viktor
Agriculture and Trade Analysis Division
Economic  Research Service
United States Department of Agriculture
Staff Report #  AGES9314
1993
The Environment,  Government  Policies, and International Trade: A
Proceedings
Shane,  M.D.,  and H.  von Witzke, eds.
Proceedings of a Meeting of the
International Agricultural Trade Research  Consortium
December,  1990,  San Diego, CA
,  '  '  y  rrna+kan  c+aran  nx  k . a.,  mc  aras.,m  xxas  y-m  s
a;  a  . . )u  ..  y;  _  7i  "a'S  7'.  "  "  F:  :if  '  e  a  d66 ,asva-.~rx:u _.  ..Chapter 2
A  Constitutional Political




The purpose of this chapter is  not to enter the longstanding  debate  on
the economics  of international  trade,  a  debate that  is concerned  with the
economic  consequences  of free trade  compared  with various  forms  of
protection  (Vousen,  1990).  Nor do  I intend to  enter the growing
discussion  on the political  economy  of protection  which  looks at  the
political determinants  of protectionist regimes  and seeks  to explain the
latter in terms  of an equilibrium  between  conflicting interests  in a
political  market  (Magee,  Brock,  and Young,  1989).  Instead,  taking as
undisputed what seems to  me to be the main thrust of the economics  of
international  trade and of the political economy  of protection, I want to
approach  some of the more fundamental issues  of free trade and
protection  from a constitutional  political economy viewpoint.
Constitutional  political  economy focuses  on the systematic
interdependence  between  what Hayek (1969)  has  called the order  of rules
and  the order of actions  (that is, the interdependence  between  the nature
of the legal and  institutional  framework of socio-economic-political
interactions)  and the character  of the order  of actions or patterns  of
behavior that result from the respective  framework.  As  its name suggests,
constitutional  political  economy  has much  in common with  political
economy  as commonly understood.  They both  extend  economic  analysis
by  applying it to the political  environment  within which  ordinary
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economy different from its better  known counterpart  is its  special
emphasis  on the  distinction between  two levels  of choice:  Choices within
rules  (choices  made within a given institutional  framework)  as opposed  to
choices  among rules  (choices that concern the institutional  framework
itself).  Stated  in yet another way, constitutional  political  economy starts
from the systematic  distinction between  in-period  choices  and
constitutional  choices,  and  it directs  its principal  attention  to  the latter,
the constitutional  level  of choice.
The analogy with  ordinary games,  though not perfectly fitting,  is  helpful
in illustrating the basic concern of the constitutional  perspective.  In
parlor games  or games  of sport,  we can clearly distinguish  between
choices  of strategies  within an agreed  set of rules  and choices among
rules.  We engage in the latter when we change  "the rules of the game,"
and we  presumably do so with the intention  to improve  the game, where
with  "improve" we typically  mean  to make the flow  of the game  more
attractive to  the players or,  in other words,  to make its  "order of actions"
more desirable  to  the participants.  Life  in society  is  certainly  in many
regards dramatically  different from a game.  The interests  that bring us
together in real social  life are much more varied  and most often  much
more serious.  And we typically  cannot as  easily  enter  and exit  the social
groups in which we  participate,  as we  can with games.  Even so, it is just
as true for our "real" social life  that we interact within  rules of the game
which shape the order of action that  emerges among us  for better or
worse.  The laws,  rules, and customs  that define  the institutional
constraints within which  we act and interact generate  an  overall order  of
actions which we,  the  "players," may find more  or less  desirable.  And  just
as with  ordinary games,  the principal  means  by which  we can hope  to give
our socio-economic-political  arrangements  a  more desirable  character  is
to seek to  improve  the rules of the game.
What  is a constitutional  political  economy of international  trade  about?
For my purposes  here,  I want  to interpret the notion of international
trade in the broad  sense in which  it  includes all across-border  economic
activities;  that is,  all activities that  involve movements  of goods and
services,  of capital, and  of persons across national  boundaries.  Thus,  the
particular  subject  of a constitutional  approach  is the rules  which  pertain
to such across-border  activities,  or, as  I  shall call them here,  the
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problems which may give rise to  international  rules:  The problem  of the
enforcement  of border-crossing  contracts and the problem  of protection.
The  next section will  address in more detail  the enforcement  problem  in
international  trade, followed by a discussion of the role  of international
rules in dealing  with protection.  The concluding  section  provides a brief
discussion  on the relation between  free trade--as  a general  principle of
free movement  of goods,  capital, and persons--and  competition  among
governments.
Problems  and Rules  in International  Trade
One of the most noticeable  developments  in the study of social  rules and
institutions  is the increased  use of game theoretical  concepts,  especially
the prisoners' dilemma  concept.  The perspective of game theory helps  to
sharpen  a notion that has always  played a central  role  in institutional
analysis,  namely the idea that rules can be usefully looked  at  as "social
tools" which serve to provide standard solutions to  recurrent  problems.
Just as we have tools,  in the ordinary  sense, for solving  problems that we
face recurrently,  such as a saw for cutting wood, we can think of social
rules as devices that help us  deal with recurrent  problems  in social
interaction,  like the rules  of the road that allow for a smoother  flow of
traffic than would otherwise be possible.
If we look at international  trade from such a perspective,  two  problems
immediately come to  mind that tend  to create obstacles  to the  realization
of potential gains  from trade.  The first  problem has to  do with  the fact
that economic  exchanges  often cannot be transacted  strictly
simultaneously, but require  one party  to move first  and to give up  a
valuable  resource before the other  half of the  transaction can be
concluded.  For such transactions  to be carried  out, and the gains that
they promise to  the potential traders  to  be realized,  the party which  is to
move first has  to have a sufficient  reason  to trust  in the other  party's
compliance.  In settings where  the prospective  traders  are involved  in
continuous  dealings and/or directly  know each  other, personal  trust can
provide such a  reason.  However,  if personal  trust were  the only remedy
for the problem, the extent  of the market  over which trade  expands  would
1  The "constitutional  approach" has much in common  with  the theoretical  perspective  of
German  Ordo-liberalism  (Vanberg,  1988).  For contributions  from  the  latter perspective  to
the issue of the international  economic order,  see Groner and Schiiller  (1989),  Molsberger
and Kotios (1990),  and Oppermann  and Conlan  (1990).
The Environment and  International Trade 8be very limited,  and so would, in Adam Smith's terms, the division  of
labor which is the source  of the gains that can be realized  through trade.
While  technological advancements,  for instance in transportation  and
communication,  are relevant in expanding the size  of markets, the  most
important  step in this process is, as economic  historians like Douglass
North  (1987,  p. 421) argue,  the "development of a third  party to
exchanges, namely government," which enforces contracts  that extend
beyond  the narrow bounds  defined by personal trust  and continuous
dealings.  Yet, the  effectiveness  of government  as enforcing  agent finds its
own limitations in the  territorially defined boundaries  of national
jurisdictions.  And the problem arises  of how in the international  realm a
foundation can be provided for the kind of trust that is required  for
potential traders to be able to realize gains  from trade transaction across
jurisdictional borders.  The second  problem in border-crossing  trade is,
indeed, the major theme of international  trade theory, namely the
obstacles that arise from the various  forms  of protection with which
national governments  intervene  in the trading process.
An often noted, seeming paradox  in international  trade is the striking
contrast between the lessons of economic theory and observed political
practice.  On the one side is the  theory of international  trade which,
basically  since Adam Smith's arguments on the nature and causes of the
wealth of nations, teaches that free trade is the best policy if the general
welfare of a nation is  to be promoted  (Bhagwati,  1989, pp. 23ff.).  On the
other hand, protectionist policies are pervasively  practiced  and are the
rule rather than the  exception, throughout  history and across the world.
If one is not content with simply attributing such paradox  to the
irrationality of politics, the question  arises as to how a systematic account
may be provided from within the standard economic paradigm  of rational,
self-interested  behavior.
Game theory suggests a  prime candidate  for such an account, namely the
concept of the prisoners' dilemma.  This concept is  the paradigm case for
situations  where the separate, rational pursuit of individual interests
generates  an overall outcome which  makes all participants  worse off than
they could have been; or, in the jargon of game theory, by choosing  their
individually  rational dominant strategies, the players  produce an outcome
that is inferior to what would have  resulted had they chosen their
individually irrational dominated strategies.  Explanations of the
"protection paradox" in terms of the prisoners'  dilemma (PD)  concept
have indeed been  proposed, though they come  in two critically different
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other tracing it back to an intranational  PD.
The international version of the PD argument  can be found, for instance,
in The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).  Axelrod  cites  the issue of trade
barriers between  two  industrial nations as a "good example  of the
fundamental problem of cooperation," arguing that, even  though  the
countries would be better off if there were no barriers, this does  not bring
about free trade because "whatever one country does,  the other country  is
better off retaining its own  trade barriers."  This view is dubious for at
least two  reasons.  The  first is its implied  assumption that free  trade is
advantageous  only  if generally  practiced, but unilateral free  trade would
be self-damaging  to a  country.  International trade theory teaches  in
essence  (that is, except  for certain special contingencies)  the exact
opposite.  Though the gains  from free trade are greater the larger the set
of free traders, free trade enhances  the welfare of a nation even  if
practiced unilaterally.  Or, as Jan Tumlir (1983)  put it: "It is,  of course,
the case  that free trade would  benefit even  a single  country, or a small
group of them,  in a generally  protectionist world.  But it is also true that
the extent of the benefit to  each depends  on the number  of countries
participating in the system  of such  trade."
The second  problem with the "international PD" theory of protectionism
is its implied treatment of nations as unit actors which  rationally pursue
their interests, a  perspective that  is quite common  in the  "game theory  of
international politics."2 Such a perspective  can either be interpreted in a
holistic way which would be blatantly inconsistent with  the
methodological  individualism  that is generally regarded  as the
paradigmatic trademark of economic  theory.  Or, it can be  read as
reflecting  the assumption  that governments  generally  act as benevolent
and reliable  maximizers of their nations'  common good.  Although  the
latter assumption has its tradition in welfare economics,  the advent  of
public choice theory has dramatically  reduced  the number  of economists
who continue  to consider it a useful device for the study of economic
policy.  Public choice theory has  done so by pointing to,  and
systematically  drawing conclusions  from,  the simple  fact that governments
are made  up of individual persons who  have their own interests,  no less
than ordinary  economic actors,  and that they pursue  these  interests within
2 Snidal (1986)  refers to this view  as the "realist position" in the  game  theory of
international politics,  and he  claims  that "(t)his conception  of nation-states as
interdependent,  goal-seeking  actors lies  at the heart of  strategic game  analysis."
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them.
The modern political economy of protection can be understood  as an
application  of public choice theory to the realm of trade  politics.  By
systematically  disaggregating  the political  process  into the underlying
interplay of particular  interests, the theory is able to provide  a quite
straightforward  explanation  for the "paradox of protection"  (Frey,  1984,
pp.  20ff.;  Weck-Hannemann,  1989, pp.  3ff.;  Krueger,  1990).  This theory
can show that the principal  obstacles to the realization  of free trade  lay at
the intranational  (rather than the international)  level,  namely in  the
differential  benefits that government  can provide  to special  interests by
granting protection for particular  industries or trades.  The problem of
protection  is indeed diagnosed  as a prisoners'  dilemma, but  as one that
has its roots  on the  intranational  level,  rather than  in conflicts  of interests
among nations.  The problem of protection in international  trade  is
critically different  from problems such  as environmental  pollution  which
may justly be classified as international  PD's (von  Witzke  and Livingston,
1990).
The theory of protectionism  as an intranational  prisoners'  dilemma
problem (Schuknecht,  1990)  explains  protectionist  policies  as a  result of
rent-seeking  (Tollison,  1982).  It states, in short,  the following:  Although,
as traditional  trade theory argues,  free trade  is the "best policy" for a
country overall,  any particular industry can benefit  from being  protected
against foreign competition,  and, therefore,  has an incentive  to seek  to
achieve  such protection.  While all would be better off if nobody were
protected,  to seek protection  is the dominant  choice for each  industry
acting  separately.  Being protected  is preferable  independently  of what is
true for  the other industries:  If nobody  else is  protected,  one's  own
protection yields  a differential  advantage,  and so it does  if a few or all
others  are protected as well.
From  a constitutional  economics  perspective,  the argument  can  be
restated  in terms  of the distinction between  the constitutional and the
inperiod level  of choice:  If we were  made to choose  between  alternative
institutional-constitutional  regimes,  a free-trade  regime on  the one side,
and a regime  characterized  by  pervasive  protectionism  on the other side,
we would certainly  prefer to  live in the former because  it would promise
to be the wealthier  society.  Such choice  at the level  of regimes would
reflect what one  may call our constitutional  preferences,  our preferences
over alternative constitutional  rules, preferences  that are informed  by our
A Constitutional Political Economy
Perspective on International Trade  11perception  of the working properties  of alternative  constitutional  systems
(Vanberg  and Buchanan,  1989). The prisoners' dilemma nature  of the
problem  lies in the  fact that our constitutional  preference for a free-trade
regime  does by no means assure  that, in the arena of ordinary  politics, we
would all have an incentive to refrain  from protectionist  lobbying.  What
requires  us to draw a careful distinction here  is the different  nature of
constitutional  choices  among  regimes as opposed  to strategic  choices
within regimes.  Advocating  free trade on  the constitutional  level, and
seeking  protection for one's particular trade  on the subconstitutional  level
of inperiod politics  is not inherently inconsistent.  These are simply  two
different  levels of choice,  involving fundamentally  different choice-
alternatives:  Alternative regimes  in the one case, and alternative
strategies within regimes  in the other.
The recognition  that, if required  to choose to  live either  in a  free-trade or
a protectionist environment,  we would rationally choose the former, does
not, for the reasons  explained,  imply that we  could be expected  to
voluntarily  abstain from protectionist  rent-seeking  in ordinary  politics.
Nor does it imply that, within existing regimes,  characterized  by varying
institutional  mixtures of free trade and protection, we could  easily agree
to support general constitutional  prohibitions  of protection.  The
interests that drive protectionist  rent-seeking  in ordinary politics  cannot
be expected  to mysteriously  evaporate  as we move  up to  the level of
constitutional  politics.  The differences  between  particular  industries with
regard  to their previous  success  in securing protection  create vested
interests which,  despite the overall  wealth increase  that movements
towards  a free-trade  constitution  should promise,  may still  expect to be
differentially  advantaged  by the status quo  regime.  Yet, though  certainly
driven by  interests, the dynamics  of constitutional  politics is not just a
mere duplication of the conflicts that  characterize  ordinary politics.  For
reasons  amply discussed  under such  labels  as "veil of uncertainty" or "veil
of ignorance"  (Vanberg and  Buchanan,  1990),  the prospects  for agreement
are enhanced  as we move to the  more generalized  reflections  that
constitutional  decisions  on rules  command.  And  for the  free-trade issue,
in particular,  a fuller  account of all the direct  and indirect wealth  effects
of protectionist  restrictions  may show  that a constitutional  prohibition  of
protection  is likely to promise net gains and,  therefore, be agreeable  even
for the current "beneficiaries" of protectionist  regimes,  because  they are
both  producers  and consumers  (Buchanan and Lee,  1991).
If there are indeed constitutional  interests  in free  trade hidden behind,  or
buried by, protectionist  policies,  the question  arises of how  these
constitutional  interests  may be effectively  implemented.  Before discussing
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cut across jurisdictional boundaries.
Protective State and Trade  Protection
North (1987)  draws a useful distinction among three types of trade
arrangements: personal exchange,  impersonal exchange,  and impersonal
exchange  with third-party enforcement.  In personal  exchange, the traders
possess, because  of repeat dealings  or otherwise,  "a great  deal of personal
knowledge  about the attributes, characteristics,  and features  of each
other"  (p.  420).  This situation makes for low transaction  costs,  but,
because such conditions are confined to  dense social  networks, personal
exchange sets rather narrow limits to the extent  of the market and,
therefore, to the potential for specialization and division  of labor.
Going beyond the confines of personal  exchange,  and entering  the "world
of impersonal exchange"  (North,  1987),  means  increasing potential  for
specialization  and division  of labor and,  thus, significant  gains in
productivity or a significant decrease  in production costs.  But,
transaction costs significantly increase because  of the increased  difficulties
in enforcing the terms of exchange.  The emergence  of an enforcing third
party,  namely government, allows for the reduction  in transaction  costs
that is required if the potential gains from impersonal  exchange  are to be
fully realized  (North,  1987).
North's notion of government  as a third-party enforcer corresponds  to
what Buchanan  (1975, pp.  68 ff.)  has called  the protective state, in
distinction from the conceptually  different "productive" state, the agency
through which  politically  organized  individuals  provide themselves with
"public goods." The  protective state ideally operates as  a strictly  neutral
and impartial enforcer  of agreed-on  rules and of contractual  obligations
voluntarily entered  into by trading parties.  The state's  essential  function
is to  provide and enforce  an institutional framework  which  facilitates
voluntary trade.  In other words, the protective  state's  proper role  is to
remove obstacles  to voluntary  exchange,  such as  fraud and coercion.  Yet,
the development  of government  as an enforcing  agent is  a double-edged
sword.  With the concentration  of power in the hand of the state  comes
the potential for this power  to be used to impose and enforce rules which
favor  certain interest  groups at the expense of others.  Although the
protective  state  plays an essential role in facilitating  free trade,  its
coercive  power  can  also be employed to inhibit free trade through
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again the principal  subject of the political  economy of protection  and of
the theory of rent-seeking more generally.
In the remainder of this section, I want to concentrate  on  the "pure" role
of the protective state and, in particular,  on the question  of what  the
territorial confines of its jurisdictional  domain imply for the problem of
international  trade.  Put simply, the question is whether the
fragmentation  in national jurisdictions or, in short, the "territoriality of
law" (Schmidtchen  and Schmidt-Trenz,  1990),  leaves  obstacles  to border-
crossing trade, the effective removal  of which would require an enforcing
agent with transnational  or supranational  authority.
The international realm,  the world of international  relations,  is often
described  as a state of anarchy,  not unlike the "state of nature" in the
Hobbesian sense  (Oye, ed.,  1986;  Kratochwil,  1989,  pp. 3  f.).  If this
characterization were  adequate, one should expect that voluntary trade  in
the international  arena would be subject to the same limitations  that
hamper cooperation  in the Hobbesian arena.  That is, we should expect
that, in the terms  of North's argument,  any effective  extension  of trade
beyond  the confines of personal exchange  would require  the emergence  of
an enforcing  agency on the international  level to bring about the decrease
in transaction  costs that is  needed for the potential  gains from impersonal
exchange  to be realized.  Prima  facie evidence contradicts  such  reasoning.
Though we have not witnessed the emergence  of a world Leviathan,
international  trade has been successfully  carried  out through  known
history and its volume  in today's world  is obviously gigantic, covering  the
whole globe.
Coming up with  an answer for why impersonal  exchange  is feasible  in the
international  realm despite the absence  of an international enforcing
agency is not too difficult.  Going back to the original issue  of impersonal
exchange,  one can locate the essential  problem  in the difficulty  for
potential traders  to make credible  commitments-commitments  which
would assure  their respective  counterparts  that they will indeed  conclude
their part of the deal.  In personal  exchange,  such  credibility derives  from
personal knowledge.  In impersonal  exchange,  traders  can make  their
commitments  credible by mutually submitting to the dictum  and
enforcement  of a  third-party.  Thus, as North argues, the development  of
government  has  an essential role in expanding  the extent of the market
and in providing for the gains from specialization  and division of labor
that come with  it.
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is apparently essential in providing a low-cost method for making  credible
commitments.  Once national  governments  exist and we move into  the
realm of international  impersonal  exchange, the commitment  problem
takes on a critically different  nature.  On the national level, there is
apparently no full-fledged  substitute for government  enforcement,
although  there have been effective  "partial," nongovernment substitutes
which have helped,  through history, to facilitate  impersonal  trade, such  as
private  commercial law, the so-called  "law merchant"  (Trakman,  1983;
Benson,  1990).  In the realm of international  trade,  however, a substitute
for an international  enforcement  agency is  available, namely the existing
national governments.  Traders  can make credible commitments  in
international  transactions  if the enforcement  systems  in their respective
home countries can be used by their foreign counterparts  to  enforce
compliance with the terms of a  contract.
The credibility that a national  enforcement system  provides  to contractual
commitments exchanged  among domestic traders can easily and effectively
be extended  to international  transactions  by granting  equal enforceability
to contracts between domestic and foreign traders.  This situation is what
we observe and what allows for a rather smooth  operation of
international  trade, although  differences  between  different  national legal
systems  introduce ambiguities which pose obstacles  that are absent within
national jurisdictions  (Schmidtchen  and Schmidt-Trenz,  1990).  The
reason why traders find it in their constitutional  interest to  have their
domestic courts enforce  foreign  claims is clear.  Traders who  can back up
their commitments by the enforcement  power  of their  own domestic
jurisdictions  are more attractive trading-partners  for foreigners,  compared
with those who cannot,  and they will, therefore,  encounter more and
better opportunities  for profitable  exchange  (Moser,  1990,  pp.  13ff.;
Vanberg and Buchanan,  1988,  p.  152).
The above  situation implies that  the absence of an international
enforcement agency  need not pose a real  obstacle to international  trade.
The credibility of commitments  in international  transactions  can  be
effectively  provided through national jurisdictions.  The enforceability  of
international  contracts  is a direct function of the effectiveness  and
reliability  of national jurisdictions,  so that  the international order  may be
said  to be, a "reflection of national  constitutional  order" (Moser,  1990,  p.
139; Tumlir,  1983, p.  80).
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Players who face a prisoners'  dilemma type of situation can escape  the
dilemma if they can exchange credible  commitments  to not use their
dominant "defection" strategy.  Commitments are credible and  effective  to
the extent that they introduce  incentives which eliminate the dominance
of the noncooperative  choice.  Commitments serve  as constraints  on
behavior.  They have the function of eliminating  strategy-options  from a
player's  choice  set.  And the prisoners' dilemma is the  paradigm for a
situation in which the exchange  of commitments,  the deliberate  adoption
of mutual constraints,  restricting one's choice set, allows players to  realize
gains which otherwise would not be attainable.
I have  argued above that the problem of protectionism  is a prisoners'
dilemma type problem, but intranational  rather than international.  Such
diagnosis would suggest that commitments on the national  rather than the
international level would be required to  solve the problem.  If
intranational rent-seeking,  rather than conflicting  interests on the
international  level, drives protectionist  politics, the proper remedy would
seemingly have to  come from an exchange  of commitments  among
intranational  interest groups rather than from an exchange  of
commitments between  nations.  What we  observe  in reality seems  to
reflect  the exact opposite:  Free trade  issues are typically  the subject of
international  agreements,  rather than of intranational  constitutional
politics.
Two questions  arise in this context.  First, why do we find  the
problem of protectionism  to be a concern  of international  politics?
Second,  protection becomes  a subject  of international  agreements;  can
such agreements  provide  effective  solutions to this problem?  Concerning
the first question, one must  remember  that, although protectionism  is
essentially an intranational  problem,  a nation's  economic wealth  is still
hurt other nations'  protectionist  policies.  The protectionism  of other
countries  does not change the fact that  a nation's overall welfare is still
better served by free trade rather than by a protectionist  policy.  The  free-
trade nation's gains from trade  are clearly  reduced  compared  with what
they could be if the other countries  were free traders  too.  Negative
external effects  derive  from protectionist  policies, and these negative
effects  create  a mutual interest  among nations  in their respective trade
policies.  This  fact alone could explain  why we find protectionism  to be a
subject of international  politics,  yet the political economy  of protection
has added, as a  further reason, the observation  that, due to the dynamics
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commitments  may be easier for politicians to secure  if such commitments
come in the form of a negotiated  "exchange"  with other governments
rather than in the form of unilateral  constitutional guarantees.
The second question,  concerning the effectiveness  of international
agreements  as a substitute  for national constitutional  prohibitions  of
protectionist policies,  has a  "yes, but"  answer.  Yes, international
agreements  could,  in principle,  serve  the same purpose  as national
constitutional  provisions.  But, enforceability  is a problem.  There  is no
third-party  enforcer to whom the contracting governments  could turn to
give credibility  to their antiprotection commitments,  and how sovereign
nations should be able  to create an appropriate  international  enforcement
agency is far from clear.  Such an enforcer should be powerful enough to
force individual nations into compliance with agreed-on  commitments  and
at the same  time be safeguarded "against any abuse  of that very
substantial  power" (Tumlir,  1983, p.  83).  Although  the recourse  to the
national level makes an international  agency for the enforcement  of
privately  negotiated trades  dispensable,  such an  agency  seems  hardly
workable  for contracts among governments  that would  be required  to act
as their own guardians.
Free-trade  commitments are apparently  easier to  achieve  in the form  of
commitment-exchanges  among governments  than in the form of unilateral
constitutional  guarantees  on the national  level.  And,  in principle, such
international commitments  could serve as genuine substitutes  for national
constitutional  provisions.  The problem,  however, is that their  effective
enforcement  seems to require  an international  enforcement  agency which
does not exist and is unlikely  to be created.  With regard  to the
enforcement  problem  for international  free-trade  agreements,  a proposal
advanced  by Jan Tumlir may promise  a feasible  solution,  a solution which
capitalizes  on the  fact that protectionism  is ultimately a matter  of
intranational  conflicts of interest.  Tumlir's proposal  (Hauser and others,
1988,  pp. 226ff.;  Moser, 1990, pp. 33ff.)  is that internationally  negotiated
commitments among  governments  be translated  or incorporated  into the
respective  domestic legal-constitutional  order in such  a way that  they
create rights  for individual  citizens,  enforceable  in domestic  courts, such
as, the right to import certain  goods without governmental  interference.
In Tumlir's  (1983,  p. 82)  own words:  "One can imagine the international
economic  policy commitments of a government  to be undertaken  in the
form of self-executing  or directly effective  treaty provisions,  creating
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These rights would be enforceable  in national  courts  only, with no
sacrifice  of legal sovereignty."
Free Trade and Intergovernmental  Competition
Protectionist  measures prohibit voluntary  transactions  that otherwise
would take place among domestic producers/consumers  and foreign
producers/consumers.  Thus,  free-trade commitments  are,  in the first
instance,  not concessions that governments  make to each other. They are,
instead, about the distribution of rights between  governments  and their
citizens.  They are constraints on the discretionary  power with which
governments  can interfere  in the economic  activities of their citizens.
They provide assurances  to citizens  that they can engage  in economic
transactions with foreigners  free from politically imposed  obstacles.
"(I)nternational economic policy rules under which governments  commit
themselves  to maintain  freedom of and nondiscrimination  in legitimate
international  transactions  of their citizens  represent important  additional
protection of private  property rights -- 'the second  line of national
constitutional  entrenchment'"  (Tumlir,  1983, p.  83).3
Free trade in the general  sense of free movement of goods and services,
capital and persons,  is a principle  that  is not only important  with regard
to  economic efficiency  as traditionally understood.  Free trade  is an
essential  device  through which individuals can secure  their rights  from
government encroachment,  a device through which  they can effectively
control governmental  powers. The rights of participation  in  collective
political  decisionmaking  that liberal  democracies  provide  for their citizens
are, without  any doubt, extremely important  in keeping  governments
responsive  to the interests  of those whom  they govern,  as  a comparison  of
alternative  forms  of government  clearly reveals.  Yet, public choice  theory
has  made us aware of the limits of democratic  collective choice
mechanisms  in large  constituencies  as to their capacity  to establish a
sensitive  link between  citizens'  interests and governmental  policies
(Vanberg and Buchanan,  1990).  These  limits characterize  the operation
of ordinary  politics, and they characterize  in no lesser way  the realm  of
constitutional  politics.
STumlir (1983)  continues:  "This reasoning  leads to the  conclusion that national  courts,
rather than diplomacy, can  and should provide  the necessary  authoritative  interpretation  of
the  international commitments  governments  undertake  in matters of economic  policy."
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considerably  strengthen  the power of control that  citizens, as individuals,
are able to exercise  over  their governments.  While  in their capacity  as
voter-citizens,  they can codetermine  the choice among  constitutional
regimes, with their vote rapidly becoming insignificant  as the size of the
constituency increases.  Individuals are free to  move with their economic
activities,  investments,  and human capital between  locations  that allows
them to choose individually  and separately among alternative
constitutional  regimes.  In this sense,  free trade introduces  an important
element of competition  into relations  among governments.  If individuals
are free to  move with their resources between  different jurisdictions,
governments  must compete for these resources,  in much the same way in
which  firms must compete for the  funds of consumers,  the financial
contributions  of investors, and the input of potential  employees.
Such competition can help  to establish,  in the political realm, a
responsiveness  of governments  to citizens'  interests, which  is similar to
the responsiveness  that market  competition  induces in the relation
between  producers and consumers,  an observation which  Tiebout
summarized  as follows:  "Spatial mobility provides the local  public-goods
counterpart to the private market's  shopping  trip" (1956,  p. 23).  The
right and the capacity of individuals to  move resources between
jurisdictions  impose effective constraints  on governments  (Hirschman,
1981,  253ff.)  and have, for obvious  reasons,  been important  themes  in
contributions  on federalism in general  (Hayek,  1948, pp. 258,  260) and on
fiscal federalism  in particular (Brennan  and Buchanan,  1980,  168ff.;
Wiseman,  1990, p.  122).  This theme has been further discussed  by Breton
(1987,  pp. 268ff.)  and others  (Wildavsky,  1990, 43ff.;  Dye, 1990, p. 71)  in
writings  on federalism  as intergovernmental  competition.4
These arguments  on the role  of free trade in securing the responsiveness
of governments  do not imply that  no circumstances  were  conceivable
under which citizens,  in pursuit of their constitutional  interests, could
agree on jointly submitting  to certain  limitations on  the mobility of
goods, capital, and persons  (Kindleberger,  1986,  pp.  3ff.).  What is
implied, however,  is that the effects  that such  limitations  have on the
power of control that  citizens can exercise  over their governments  should
be properly  considered.
SSinn (1989,  1990) discusses  "competition among governments"  as  an effect  of the
international mobility of capital.
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